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CLARIFYING NONPROFIT PURCHASE 
RIGHTS IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
Brandon M. Weiss* 
Disputes around the country are proliferating as limited partner 
investors attempt to thwart the ability of nonprofits to exercise 
statutorily defined rights of first refusal to acquire low-income housing 
tax credit developments upon the expiration of rent restrictions.  Such 
efforts, increasingly being made by “aggregator” investors, frustrate 
congressional intent, violate long-held norms and expectations in the 
industry, are costly for nonprofits to litigate, jeopardize the ongoing 
affordability of an already scarce federally assisted housing stock, and 
threaten to displace low-income tenants.  This Essay describes the 
problem, explores the collision of housing policy and tax policy that 
gives rise to it, considers various conceptual approaches to resolution, 
and provides specific policy recommendations using the Affordable 
Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019 as a point of departure.  The 
Essay argues that working with Congress to address this problem 
should be a higher policy priority for the Biden Administration than 
attempting to salvage former President Trump’s flawed Opportunity 
Zone initiative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two important questions emerged during the excellent symposium 
hosted by the Fordham Urban Law Journal in February 2021 on the 
topic of A Taxing War on Poverty: Opportunity Zones and the Promise 
of Investment and Economic Development.  The final panel of the day 
addressed the future of Opportunity Zones,1 former President Trump’s 
primary economic development initiative, under the new Biden 
Administration.  Given the panoply of critiques that have been levied 
at Opportunity Zones,2 the panel concluded the day by considering a 
couple of key issues: 1) what else might the federal government do with 
the billions of dollars in annual forgone tax revenue in lieu of providing 
the Opportunity Zone incentives and 2) given scarce policymaking 
bandwidth, what else might be a higher priority in the new 
administration’s community development policy agenda than salvaging 
this troubled Trump initiative.  Elsewhere, I am writing on the former, 
arguing that the foregone revenue would be better spent increasing 
direct rental assistance to the lowest-income U.S. households.3  This 
 
 1. Congress created the Opportunity Zone program as part of the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 2183 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 1400Z-1, 1400Z-2). The program provides a variety of tax incentives to 
taxpayers who invest capital gains in certain designated “low-income communities.” 
See id. 
 2. See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 82 (2020) (highlighting corruption in the designation of Opportunity Zones, 
absence of use restrictions on eligible investments, and lack of community 
participation). Much of the Fordham Urban Law Journal symposium centered on 
considering critiques of the program. 
 3. See Brandon M. Weiss, Opportunity Zones, 1031 Exchanges, and Universal 
Housing Vouchers, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (critiquing the Opportunity 
Zone program as based on a flawed theoretical model and arguing that the value of 
the tax incentives would be better directed toward low-income rental assistance). 
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brief Essay considers the latter and offers one time-sensitive 
alternative. 
Unlike the Opportunity Zone program, which does not require the 
provision of any particular goods or services,4 the federal Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)5 program has produced more than three 
million units of generally high-quality affordable housing for low-
income households across the United States.6  While also no stranger 
to critique,7 the program remains politically popular on a bipartisan 
basis — Congress recently significantly increased the tax credit8 and is 
currently considering legislation to do so again.9  Biden campaigned on 
a promise to expand the credit “with a $10 billion investment.”10  
LIHTC essentially is the only significant federal program that provides 
annual support for the construction of new low-income housing.  As a 
 
 4. See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based 
Investment Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 
WIS. L. REV. 745, 770 (2019) (noting that businesses can claim Opportunity Zone 
incentives without providing any specific local benefits). 
 5. Congress created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program as part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–208 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 42). For a comparison of the LIHTC and Opportunity Zone 
programs, see Tracy A. Kaye, Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at 
the LIHTC and OZ Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 
2021). 
 6. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. 
DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/9WPE-
6VF6] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (stating that the program created at least 3.23 million 
housing units in 48,672 projects between 1987 and 2018). 
 7. Critiques have included that LIHTC is inefficient, fails to reach the lowest-
income tenants without additional subsidy, can result in higher rent-burdens for 
tenants than other federal housing programs, and fails to adequately locate housing in 
high-opportunity neighborhoods. See, e.g., Katherine O’Regan & Keren Horn, What 
Can We Learn About the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program by Looking at 
the Tenants?, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 597 (2013). 
 8. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 102, 131 
Stat. 348, 1157 (increasing the amount of tax credits that states can allocate by 12.5% 
for calendar years 2018 through 2021). 
 9. See Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2021, S. 1136, 117th Cong. 
§ 101 (as introduced on Apr. 15, 2021); see also Dirk Wallace & Peter Lawrence, 2021 
Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act Could Finance More than 2 Million 
Additional Affordable Rental Homes over 10 Years, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 15, 2021, 
12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/2021-affordable-
housing-credit-improvement-act-could-finance-more-2-million-additional-affordable 
[https://perma.cc/G2YF-MCHK] (noting that the bill would result in a 25% increase in 
LIHTC authority in 2021 and 2022). 
 10. See The Biden Plan for Investing in our Communities Through Housing, BIDEN 
HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/housing/ [https://perma.cc/A2ZY-GG9E] (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2021). 
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permanent tax credit created in 1986 that appears here to stay, it is 
worth improving. 
Unfortunately, as discussed herein, disputes are proliferating around 
the country that threaten the ongoing affordability of LIHTC housing 
of a particular type: namely, projects owned by nonprofit developers 
that are nearing the end of their initial restricted use term.11  The 
disputes center on limited partner investors in LIHTC projects 
attempting to thwart the ability of nonprofit general partners to 
exercise statutorily and contractually defined “rights of first refusal” 
(ROFRs) to purchase a given project at the end of the initial 
compliance period from the tax credit partnership at below-market 
levels set by Congress.  Such efforts by investors — described herein as 
the “ROFR problem” — frustrate congressional intent, violate long-
held norms and expectations in the industry, are costly for nonprofits 
to litigate, jeopardize the ongoing affordability of an already scarce 
federally assisted housing stock, and threaten to displace low-income 
tenants.  Investors use such efforts to, for example, pressure nonprofits 
into buying them out at high prices or force lucrative sales of the 
projects to third parties.12  The fact that these efforts are increasingly 
being made by so-called “aggregators,”13 new investors not party to the 
original partnership that purchase LIHTC interests nearing the end of 
their initial rent-restricted terms, is all the more reason for alarm. 
These disputes have begun to draw media coverage and broader 
attention to the issue.14  In one high profile case in southern Florida not 
far from Miami Beach, a nonprofit has spent $1.5 million litigating the 
ROFR issue against HallKeen Management, a Massachusetts-based 
investor that purchased Bank of America’s interests in a LIHTC 
project for approximately $400,000 and then sought to force a sale to a 
third party for $21 million.15  In another case involving a Brooklyn 
 
 11. See infra Section I.A. for a discussion of the relevant LIHTC timelines, 
including the initial restricted use term. 
 12. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Brandon Duong, Losing Nonprofit Control of Tax Credit Housing?, 
SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 16, 2020), https://shelterforce.org/2020/10/16/refusing-the-right-
to-refuse/?utm_source=sfweekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=101920 
[https://perma.cc/LK9Q-HNBM] (describing the “rise of aggregators”). The term 
“aggregator” presumably comes from their propensity to buy up many such interests. 
 14. See, e.g., Beth Healy & Christine Willmsen, Investors Mine for Profits in 
Affordable Housing, Leaving Thousands of Tenants at Risk, WBUR (Apr. 29, 2021), 
https://www.wbur.org/investigations/2021/04/29/investors-low-income-housing-
boston-south-end [https://perma.cc/D5DU-3RLP]; Duong, supra note 13. 
 15. See Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913-CA-01 
(44), 2020 WL 4381624 *2–4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020); see also Healy & Willmsen, 
supra note 14. 
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affordable housing complex in the gentrifying neighborhood of 
Bushwick, New York State Attorney General Letitia James filed an 
amicus brief in a ROFR dispute supporting the nonprofit developer 
against SunAmerica Housing, an investor affiliate of American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG).16  Such cases are likely to grow 
significantly in number as, year after year, an increasing number of 
LIHTC developments reach the end of their initial use restriction 
periods. 
Part I of this Essay provides relevant background on the LIHTC 
program as outlined in Section 42 of the tax code, describes how the 
ROFR problem arises within this legislative framework, and presents 
a snapshot of the disputes unfolding around the United States.  Part II 
explores on a theoretical level how the problem emerges as a mismatch 
between modern housing policy and tax policy: modern housing policy 
attempting to leverage private sector involvement in the delivery of 
low-income housing without sacrificing long-term affordability and tax 
policy requiring that investors be “true owners” of real estate projects 
in order to reap the tax incentives.  This Part also considers several 
varying conceptual approaches to resolving this mismatch.  Part III 
takes up the least disruptive and most politically palatable approach to 
resolution — within the context of the current LIHTC framework — 
and considers how the Biden Administration can work with Congress 
to resolve the problem legislatively, using the Affordable Housing 
Credit Improvement Act of 2019 as a point of departure.  It also argues 
that state housing finance agencies should amend their credit allocation 
 
 16. See Brief for State of New York and City of New York as Amici Curiae, 
Riseboro Cmty. P’ship Inc. v. Sun America Hous. Fund 682, No. 20-4223 (2d. Cir. Apr. 
14, 2021), 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/riseboro_v._sunamerica_nys_and_nyc_amicus_brie
f_as_filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/54UX-9X28] (“The bottom line is that amici’s 
significant investments in the LIHTC space would be threatened by profit-driven 
entities taking ownership at the end of the tax credit period — or even just refusing to 
leave without additional concessions. Such entities, unlike housing non-profits, have 
no inherent commitment to preserving affordability. Should the widespread and 
longstanding norm of long-term non-profit ownership be upended, this sea change 
would jeopardize the benefits created by amici’s investments, enable for-profit 
investors to reap financial returns from those public investments beyond what the 
LIHTC program already generously provides, and undermine amici’s efforts to create 
and preserve desperately needed affordable housing.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Fights to Protect Affordable 
Housing in New York (Apr. 15, 2021), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-
general-james-fights-protect-affordable-housing-new-york [https://perma.cc/VA2C-
TAYX] (“For private investors to try and skew the terms of this affordable housing 
program for their own financial gain is as harmful as it is unethical.”); Healy & 
Willmsen, supra note 14. 
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rules to ensure that tax credits flow to projects with strong nonprofit 
purchase rights. 
If the Biden Administration hopes to prioritize community 
development policies that are certain to have an immediate and 
positive impact on the lives of low-income U.S. households, it will place 
the ROFR problem at the top of its policy agenda and work swiftly 
with Congress to enact a legislative fix. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The LIHTC Framework 
Congress created the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) 
program as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.17  Successor to the 
public housing program as the dominant means by which the federal 
government provides financial assistance for the development of low-
income housing, the program is based on a model of leveraging private 
sector equity and expertise.18  Elsewhere, I have described the 
mechanics at length.19  For relevant purposes here, a typical transaction 
involves a real estate developer applying to a state housing finance 
agency for an award of federal tax credits.  If the application is 
successful, the developer generally enters into a limited partnership as 
the general partner with a private investor limited partner — usually a 
bank or other large financial institution with the annual tax liability to 
make the nonrefundable credits of value.20  The limited partner 
investor provides the equity needed to build a new affordable housing 
development and, in exchange, the partnership allocates the lion’s 
share of the tax credits, depreciation deductions, and other tax benefits 
 
 17. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–208 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 42). 
 18. The federal government experimented with a number of other programs to 
subsidize the development of low-income housing prior to arriving at the LIHTC 
model. See generally Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing — An Intimate History, 
20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 193 (2011). 
 19. See, e.g., Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing, 
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 521 (2016) (detailing the mechanics of the LIHTC program 
and arguing for a nonprofit developer preference in original LIHTC allocations). 
 20. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
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to the investor.  These benefits alone typically provide the investor with 
a healthy return on investment.21 
Relevant timeframes are key to understanding the ROFR problem. 
Section 42 of the tax code provides that investors claim the tax credits 
annually for ten years.22  LIHTC housing is subject to certain income-
eligibility requirements and rent limits for an initial 15-year compliance 
period23 and, for projects starting in 1990, an additional 15-year 
extended use period.24  For the first 15 years, the tax credits are subject 
to recapture by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if, for example, the 
developer violates the rent or income restrictions or if the project falls 
into serious physical or financial distress.25  After the first 15 years, tax 
credit recapture by the IRS is off the table and state housing agencies 
are primarily responsible for programmatic enforcement. 
Both for-profit and nonprofit developers are eligible to apply to 
state housing finance agencies for an award of LIHTCs.  In addition to 
other benefits,26 nonprofits generally are much more likely than for-
profits to maintain rents at below-market levels even beyond the 
 
 21. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENT 
SURVEY 6 (2009), https://www.nahma.org/wp-content/uploads/files/member/Tax%20
Credit/Legislative%20Study_FINAL%20092509.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3BZ-HSDM] 
(noting average annual after-tax internal rates of return of approximately 10%); 
COHNREZNICK LLP, HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENTS: INVESTMENT AND 
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 24 (2018) (noting that on a weighted average basis, 
actual yields have exceeded projected yields since 2000). Note that in addition to the 
financial benefits of LIHTC investments, banks that invest in LIHTC also receive 
valuable regulatory credit under the Community Reinvestment Act. Id. at 15 (“Banks 
are obligated, under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations, to make 
loans, provide services, and make investments in low- to moderate-income 
neighborhoods in those areas in which they take deposits. . . . The strong financial 
performance track record of housing tax credit investments has historically been an 
ideal match for bank investors with a conservative focus. There are a limited number 
of qualified equity investments under CRA regulations, and many of these have less 
attractive yield and/or risk profiles than housing credit investments. Among the 
available investment options, housing credit investments appear to be a clear investor 
favorite.”). 
 22. 26 U.S.C. § 42(b)(1)(B). 
 23. Id. § 42(i)(1). 
 24. Id. § 42(h)(6)(D); see also What Happens to LIHTC Properties After 
Affordability Requirements Expire?, HUD USER, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
pdredge/pdr_edge_research_081712.html [https://perma.cc/4PW5-FSDH] (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2021). 
 25. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(j). 
 26. Nonprofit-developed affordable housing has been found to be more likely to 
provide the deepest levels of affordability, provide on-site social services for special 
needs, include larger units for families, and have other positive spillover effects on a 
neighborhood. See Weiss, supra note 19, at 552. 
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expiration of legally required restrictions.27  As such, Section 42 
requires that states award at least 10% of their tax credits to projects 
that involve nonprofit developers, though states may exceed that 
floor.28 
B. The ROFR Provision 
Hoping to promote long-term affordability, Congress included a 
provision in Section 42 to facilitate the ability of nonprofit developers 
to buy out the limited partner investor after the initial 15-year 
compliance period. 29  The provision, Section 42(i)(7), is structured as 
a safe harbor — it ensures that none of the tax credits allocated to the 
investor will be disallowed by the IRS as the result of a qualified tax-
exempt nonprofit holding a below-market “right of first refusal” to 
purchase the property after the initial 15-year compliance period.30  In 
a typical real estate transaction, a “right of first refusal” grants the 
holder the right to purchase the property if the holder is willing to 
match the price of a third-party offer.  However, in this case, the tax 
 
 27. See OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES: OPTING IN, OPTING OUT AND REMAINING AFFORDABLE 
ix (2006) (analyzing HUD data related to HUD-subsidized housing and noting, “As 
expected, nonprofit owners were much less likely to opt out [of the subsidy program] 
compared with for-profit owners. Nonprofit owners are often mission-driven to 
continue to provide affordable housing”); see also OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND 7 (2012) [hereinafter HUD Y15 
REPORT] (“Other factors also affect whether LIHTC properties will be repositioned to 
market rate. Many developments have socially motivated sponsors, often nonprofits 
whose mission is to create and preserve affordable housing in their neighborhoods. 
Even if no additional affordability restrictions prevent these organizations from 
converting properties to market rate, they typically maintain the units’ affordability to 
achieve their mission.”). 
 28. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5). 
 29. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d 744, 756 
(Mass. 2018) (“The legislative history of § 42(i)(7) confirms that it was intended to 
facilitate the inexpensive transfer of properties to nonprofit organizations. . . . 
Lawmakers were concerned that properties financed under the LIHTC program would 
not remain affordable in the long term, because their owners would convert them to 
market-rate housing — or sell them to third parties who would — as soon as the 
affordability restrictions were lifted. . . . Their proposed solution was to make it easier 
for nonprofit organizations to purchase the properties.” (citations omitted)). 
 30. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(7)(A) (“No Federal income tax benefit shall fail to be 
allowable to the taxpayer with respect to any qualified low-income building merely by 
reason of a right of 1st refusal held by the tenants (in cooperative form or otherwise) 
or resident management corporation of such building or by a qualified nonprofit 
organization (as defined in subsection (h)(5)(C)) or government agency to purchase 
the property after the close of the compliance period for a price which is not less than 
the minimum purchase price determined under subparagraph (B).”). 
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code defines ex ante the price at which the nonprofit will purchase the 
project upon the exercise of a Section 42 ROFR: essentially, the 
outstanding debt on the property plus any “exit taxes” that result from 
the sale — a price often referred to as “debt plus taxes.”31  As a safe 
harbor, the provision does not require that LIHTC partnerships grant 
nonprofit general partner developers a ROFR.  Rather, the provision 
simply ensures that if a nonprofit successfully bargains for a below-
market ROFR in the context of a LIHTC deal, other principles of tax 
law, discussed in Part II infra, will not operate to disallow the claiming 
of LIHTCs by the investor. 
Notwithstanding the non-mandatory safe harbor nature of the 
provision, as the LIHTC industry matured in the years following the 
credit’s creation in the 1986 tax overhaul, ROFRs drafted pursuant to 
Section 42(i)(7) became a standard feature of LIHTC deals involving 
nonprofit developers.32  Investors viewed the tax credits, claimed over 
the first ten years, as their primary economic incentive for doing these 
deals.33  By the end of the initial 15-year compliance period, all credits 
have been claimed and IRS recapture is no longer a threat.34  Analysis 
of investor prospectus documents forecasting expected profits in 
nonprofit-developed LIHTC deals reveal that investors historically did 
not assume significant gains from the sale of the property at the end of 
the initial compliance period.35  The general expectation was that 
investors would happily exit the partnership so long as any tax liability 
incurred from the exit was covered. 
 
 31. See id. § 42(i)(7)(B). 
 32. See WASH. STATE HOUS. FIN. COMM’N, NONPROFIT TRANSFER DISPUTES IN THE 
LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: AN EMERGING THREAT TO 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 4 (2019) [hereinafter WSHFC REPORT] (“This nonprofit right 
of first refusal . . . is an important component of the program that has facilitated 
nonprofit ownership of many LIHTC projects. As a matter of industry practice, 
nonprofit partners have commonly secured this right in their LIHTC partnership 
agreements, sometimes supplemented with other transfer rights the parties have 
negotiated. Investors have consistently agreed to this arrangement at the outset 
because they generally foresee ‘little economic motivation to stay’ after all tax credits 
have been claimed from the project, and prefer to avoid ‘administrative burdens’ and 
related project costs many years into the future.” (citations omitted)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. See supra notes 22, 25, and accompanying text. 
 35. Id. at 4 (“For decades, the widespread expectation and practice has been that 
the nonprofit partners will secure ownership of LIHTC projects as a matter of course 
after the 15-year compliance period, usually by exercising the statutory ROFR at the 
specified minimum price. In most deals, the original financial projections will confirm 
that ultimate transfer to the nonprofit partner at the statutory ROFR price was the 
operating assumption of all parties.”). 
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For many years, the program operated according to this expectation 
with projects regularly transferred to nonprofits pursuant to Section 42 
ROFRs.36  By one estimate contained in a 2012 report by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 95% of such 
properties were transferred to the original nonprofit developer post-
initial compliance period.37 
C. The Proliferation of Disputes 
Over the last several years, however, a new trend in the field has 
emerged, leading to burgeoning disputes around the country.  As a 
growing number of LIHTC developments have reached the end of 
their initial compliance period, various financial entities began to see 
an opportunity at this critical moment in the life of the project to 
extract value.  In some instances, these entities are the original investor 
limited partner.38  But in an increasing number of cases, new investors, 
sometimes referred to as “aggregators,” buy out original investor 
limited partner interests in nonprofit-developed LIHTC partnerships 
with projects approaching year 15.39  Investors in these disputes use a 
variety of tactics to pressure nonprofits40 — for example, refusing to 
consent to applications for financing to conduct necessary capital 
 
 36. See HUD Y15 REPORT, supra note 27, at xiii (“By far the most common pattern 
of ownership change around Year 15 is for the LPs to sell their interests in the property 
to the general partner (GP) (or its affiliate or subsidiary) and for the GP to continue 
to own and operate the property. This pattern is overwhelmingly the case for 
properties with nonprofit developers.”). 
 37. Id. at 29. 
 38. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.  
 39. See David Davenport, Year 15: Facing off with the Aggregator — Newcomers 
Try to Toss Partnership Intent Out the Window, in TAX CREDIT ADVISOR 27, 27 (2019) 
(“An aggregator — unlike a typical syndicator or investor that developers have worked 
with for years — is someone new to the general partner, who was not part of the initial 
transaction that led to the LIHTC partnership or affordable housing development, and 
who may view the partnership and its development as a financial instrument rather 
than an affordable housing real estate investment. As a result, once the development 
reaches the end of the compliance period, the aggregator aggressively may seek to 
dispose of the limited partner’s interest in the project partnership or company to 
achieve a cash windfall inconsistent with the original tax credit investor’s (and the real 
estate developer’s) intentions and expectations . . . .”). 
 40. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 5 (“These include disputing the 
conditions and scope of transfer rights; delaying, obstructing, and disagreeing with 
related valuations; refusing consent to refinancing, either outright or by placing 
significant conditions on consent; disputing fee calculations; arguing over 
typographical errors; and asserting alleged breaches of partnership duties from many 
years prior, including by arguing that rents should have been set higher to maximize 
profits.”). 
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improvements.41  Frequently, investors seek a payment in exchange for 
their exit from the partnership.42  An alternative approach is to insist 
on a sale to a third party.43  Other efforts focus on removing the 
nonprofit general partner from the partnership, for example, via claims 
of breach of fiduciary duties.44  With control of the project, an investor 
can attempt to eliminate the extended rent and income restrictions on 
the property through a technical procedure known as the “qualified 
contract” process.45  Alternatively, investors can simply wait until the 
extended use restrictions expire and convert the property to market-
rate use or sell to a third party that sees long-term upside value. 
In all cases where a nonprofit holds a Section 42 ROFR, these 
various investor efforts can only succeed if the nonprofit cannot 
successfully acquire the property pursuant to the ROFR.  Resource-
constrained nonprofits often find themselves unable to challenge 
investor practices or enforce their rights under a ROFR in court.46  Yet, 
 
 41. See NAT’L HOUS. TR., WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN INVESTOR REFUSES TO 
RECOGNIZE THE NONPROFIT RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 1 (2021) (noting that “[i]n a 
typical ROFR dispute, the prudent management of the affordable housing property is 
essentially frozen as the investor refuses to permit the general partner to undertake 
necessary capital improvements” and explaining how such disputes can lead to 
deteriorating property conditions, curtailed resident services, and an overall shorter 
useful life for the project). 
 42. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 6; see also NAT’L HOUS. TR., supra note 
41, at 2 (noting that, depending on the source of funds, such payments can have a 
variety of detrimental impacts, including reduced project reserves, increased property 
rents, additional debt on the property, or a significantly reduced balance sheet for the 
nonprofit). 
 43. See NAT’L HOUS. TR., supra note 41, at 2. 
 44. Compare Senior Hous. Assistance Grp. v. Amtax Holdings 260, LLC, No. C17-
1115RSM, 2019 WL 687837, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2019) (rejecting the investor’s 
claim that the nonprofit general partner should be removed from the partnership for 
breaching its fiduciary duty by soliciting third-party offers in an attempt to trigger its 
ROFR), with SunAmerica Hous. Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc., No. 19-11783, 
2021 WL 391420, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2021) (holding that the nonprofit general 
partner violated its fiduciary duties “by attempting to effectuate a transfer of the 
Property . . . for a below market value against the interest of the Plaintiff and the 
Partnership”). 
 45. See HUD Y15 REPORT, supra note 27, at 38–39 (describing the qualified 
contract process by which an owner can seek regulatory relief from the extended use 
restrictions). Free from the rent restrictions, investors can seek to raise rent levels 
significantly to market levels — a particularly appealing strategy in already expensive 
or gentrifying neighborhoods. State-specific policies may limit an investor’s ability to 
use the qualified contract process. Note that program rules protect tenants from 
eviction for a three-year period following termination of the rent restrictions via the 
qualified contract process. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(E)(ii). 
 46. See WSHFC REPORT, supra note 32, at 6 (“Though some nonprofits fight back, 
many lack the resources or will to do so . . . . Based on the sheer volume of litigation 
alone to date, it is obvious that substantial revenues have already been diverted from 
1170 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
in a number of cases around the country — in states including Florida,47 
Washington,48 Massachusetts,49 New York,50 Michigan,51 and in what 
appears to be a rapidly expanding list52 — litigation has emerged in 
recent years over the exercise of Section 42 ROFRs.53 
While a comprehensive review of the litigation is beyond the scope 
of this Essay, the cases generally revolve around disagreements as to 
the requisite conditions precedent that must be satisfied for a nonprofit 
to exercise its purchase rights under Section 42(i)(7).  Two key and 
related issues are central to these arguments: 1) whether the consent of 
the partnership and/or investor limited partner to sell the property is 
necessary for the nonprofit to exercise its ROFR and 2) whether a bona 
fide third-party offer is necessary to trigger the ROFR.54  These 
inquiries often take the form of considering whether the ROFR 
defined in Section 42 should be interpreted under state common law, 
which typically requires a willingness to sell by the owner and a bona 
fide arm’s-length third-party offer to trigger the exercise of a ROFR.55 
The investor limited partners in these cases argue that Congress’s 
choice of the term “right of first refusal” in Section 42 is clear and 
means conclusively that common law principles should be used in 
 
nonprofits and LIHTC projects. When transfers to nonprofits are systematically 
thwarted, or nonprofits are drained of resources that would otherwise go into these 
projects, the LIHTC program suffers and its goals are undermined.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 47. See Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913-CA-01 
(44), 2020 WL 4381624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020). 
 48. See Senior Hous. Assistance Grp., 2019 WL 687837, at *2–3. 
 49. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d 744 
(Mass. 2018). 
 50. See Riseboro Cmty. P’ship Inc. v. SunAmerica Hous. Fund 682, 482 F. Supp. 3d 
31 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 51. See SunAmerica Hous. Fund 1050 v. Pathway of Pontiac, Inc., No. 19-11783, 
2021 WL 391420 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2021). 
 52. See Davenport, supra note 39 (noting that the author, a trial lawyer who 
represents general partners in “LIHTC disputes nearing or at the end of the 
compliance period,” now represents more than 60 clients in 12 states). 
 53. The number of informal disputes likely far exceeds the number of disputes that 
reach formal litigation. 
 54. See, e.g., Riseboro Cmty. P’ship, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (“Defendants counter 
that Riseboro may exercise its ROFR to purchase the Apartment Complex only after 
two conditions precedent are satisfied: the Partnership must be willing to sell and a 
third-party must have made a bona-fide offer to buy.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc. v. Related Corp. V SLP, L.P., 99 N.E.3d 
744, 754–55 (Mass. 2018) (“At common law, . . . a right of first refusal cannot be 
exercised unilaterally, but can only be exercised where two conditions are met. First, 
the right of first refusal must be triggered by ‘a bona fide and enforceable offer to 
purchase’ the property . . . . Second, the owner of the property must have decided to 
accept that third-party offer.” (citations omitted)). 
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interpreting Section 42 ROFRs.56  These are not purchase options, 
which typically would give a party a right to purchase regardless of the 
owner’s desire to sell and without the need for a triggering third-party 
offer.57  Rather, investors argue, these are classic rights of first refusal, 
requiring owner willingness to sell and a bona fide third-party offer. 
Alternatively, nonprofits argue that Section 42 ROFRs cannot 
possibly be interpreted as common law ROFRs because of a key 
feature in Section 42: namely, the below-market “debt plus taxes” 
purchase price defined by Congress in the tax code.58  A typical 
common law ROFR does not have a pre-set purchase price — as 
described above, a traditional ROFR allows the holder to match a price 
offered by a third party.59  In setting a predetermined below-market 
purchase price, Congress thus could not have intended this mechanism 
to operate as a common law ROFR.  After all, as one court reasoned 
in a decision favorable to a nonprofit, what unrelated third party would 
go to the expense of putting together a bona fide offer on a property if 
it knew that such offer would trigger a nonprofit’s right to purchase the 
property at a below-market price?60  Given Congress’s intent to use 
Section 42(i)(7) as a mechanism to preserve the long-term affordability 
of this housing stock, surely Congress would not have granted a ROFR 
that in practice would never be exercised.  As such, nonprofits in these 
cases argue that a bona fide third-party offer must not be a 
requirement.61  Furthermore, they argue that investor consent to sell is 
 
 56. See, e.g., Senior Hous. Assistance Grp. v. Amtax Holdings 260, LLC, No. C17-
1115RSM, 2019 WL 687837, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2019) (holding for the investor 
that “the term right of first refusal is not ambiguous or open to interpretation. This 
term is precisely defined in both standard and legal dictionaries and has a specific clear 
meaning in a contract concerning real estate”). 
 57. See, e.g., Riseboro Cmty. P’ship., 482 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (“A ROFR stands in 
contrast to an ‘option’ to purchase, which may be triggered unilaterally, even against 
the owner’s unwillingness to sell at the time the option-holder invokes the option.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 58. See, e.g., Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. HK Aswan, LLC, No. 2019-16913-
CA-01 (44), 2020 WL 4381624, at *9–10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 7, 2020) (“Put simply, these 
below-market, ‘minimum purchase price’ rights of first refusal only exist[] because 
Section 42(i)(7) exists. Accordingly, . . . Defendants’ argument ‘fails to acknowledge’ 
that a Section 42 ROFR, such as the ROFR here, ‘is not purely a creation of the 
common law’ but is granted pursuant to Section 42 and must therefore be interpreted 
in light of Section 42.” (citations omitted)). 
 59. See, e.g., Homeowner’s Rehab, 99 N.E.3d at 755 (“[A] right of first refusal is 
only a preemptive right, prohibiting the owner from selling the property to a third party 
‘without first offering the property to the holder . . . at the third party’s offering price.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 60. Id. at 758. 
 61. See, e.g., Opa-Locka Cmty. Dev. Corp., 2020 WL 4381624, at *6. 
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either not required or is a matter of parsing the specific language of the 
relevant limited partnership agreement.62 
Thus far, the courts collectively have rendered a relatively split 
decision on these cases.  In Massachusetts and Florida, state courts 
have sided with the nonprofits attempting to exercise their ROFR 
rights.  In federal courts in Washington, New York, and Michigan, 
nonprofits have lost on these issues.  As this litigation spreads around 
the country, courts are likely to continue to reach differing conclusions. 
II. HOUSING POLICY AND TAX POLICY MISMATCH 
A. Evolving Housing Policy 
In considering how best to resolve the ROFR problem, it is helpful 
to zoom out from the weeds of this litigation and evaluate more 
theoretically how we arrived here.  The LIHTC program emerged in a 
political climate that viewed public housing as a flawed federal 
program.  National housing policy sought to elevate the role of the 
private sector in the provision of subsidized housing.63  The goal was to 
leverage the discipline and acumen of the private sector in 
underwriting, developing, and managing the low-income housing 
stock.  The LIHTC structure does this, in part, by ensuring that 
sophisticated financial entities have a vested interest in a project’s 
success.  The recapture provisions are key in this regard — with 
millions of dollars of tax credits at stake, the investor limited partner is 
highly motivated to ensure that the project is successful.  Proponents 
of the privatized LIHTC model think of investor limited partners as 
playing something of a quality control role. 
Yet, as profit-motivated entities, investors are only motivated to 
play this role to the extent that it aligns with their financial goals.  
Preserving long-term affordability beyond the expiration of the 
 
 62. See Homeowner’s Rehab, Inc., 99 N.E.3d at 761 (“In reaching this conclusion 
[that investor consent is not required], we emphasize that we are only interpreting the 
language of the agreements that the parties executed here.”). 
 63. Other prior privatized approaches, including the Section 221(d)(3) BMIR, 
Section 236, and Project-Based Section 8 programs, enlisted private for-profit 
developers but lacked the investor feature of LIHTC. See generally James Grow & 
Brandon Weiss, Preservation of Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 411 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2d 
ed. 2011) (describing the mechanics of these programs). As rent restrictions expired, 
housing developed by these programs ran into many of the same sort of expiring use 
challenges as described in this Essay regarding the LIHTC stock. See id. at 412 (“The 
time-limited nature of the mortgage and associated regulatory agreement thus planted 
the seed for a substantial expiring use problem to sprout decades later.”). 
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requisite use restrictions, particularly once all tax credits have been 
claimed and are beyond the reach of recapture, does not align with 
those goals.  Nonprofit developers, by contrast, regularly make it a part 
of their mission to preserve long-term affordability.  Often such efforts 
involve applying for a new round of tax credits and “resyndicating” the 
project to a new investor. 
A preferable institutional arrangement from a public policy 
perspective thus would leverage private sector underwriting and 
oversight, while placing long-term control in the hands of mission-
driven nonprofits or other public-oriented stakeholders.  Most notable 
about this arrangement is that nothing inherently requires the private 
sector stakeholder to hold an actual ownership interest in the project.  
Rather, if it were possible simply to contract with the private sector to 
provide certain technical expertise, perhaps with various performance 
metrics and incentives, this would avoid thorny backend issues that 
jeopardize the long-term public value of a project. 
B. A Collision with Tax Policy 
For political reasons unrelated to housing policy, however, Congress 
has chosen to run our primary low-income housing program through 
the tax code rather than fund it via direct appropriations.64  One 
advantage of this choice is that, as a permanent tax credit, it is available 
to all states every year without the need for congressional negotiations 
over funding levels.  Yet, the decision also brings with it a set of 
structural constraints that, while serving tax policy, do not serve any 
appreciable housing policy. 
Basic tax principles require that in order to claim the tax benefits of 
the kind that make LIHTC investments valuable, the tax credit 
partnership must be a true owner of the project.65  Furthermore, simply 
holding bare legal title is insufficient to claim the incidents of taxation 
that accompany property ownership.66  Rather, tax law considers 
whether a taxpayer holds the “benefits and burdens” of ownership in 
determining whether, for example, tax credits and valuable 
 
 64. See, e.g., Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451, 505–07 (2020) (describing how the structure 
of LIHTC as a tax credit rather than a grant program appeals to both small-
government conservatives and liberals who want to help the poor, streamlines the 
congressional committees with oversight, and eliminates the need for annual 
reauthorization). 
 65. See 2 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 17:5 (2021). 
 66. Id. 
1174 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
depreciation deductions can be claimed by a given taxpayer.67  One 
such benefit courts have considered in determining if a taxpayer is a 
true owner is whether the taxpayer holds the right to the appreciation 
of a property, which would weigh in favor of a finding of true 
ownership.68 
Congress, or at a minimum congressional staff, appears to have been 
sensitive to these tax principles in drafting the ROFR provision, which 
was included in an early amendment to the LIHTC statute in the late 
1980s.  A task force of housing experts convened by Senators George 
Mitchell and John Danforth originally recommended a stronger safe 
harbor — that tax credit partnerships could grant nonprofit 
organizations and tenant cooperatives below-market purchase options 
without jeopardizing true ownership or the ability of investors to claim 
tax credits.69  This recommendation was included in a bill that was 
introduced in the Senate in 1989.70  However, below-market purchase 
options had been viewed in other contexts as a substantial 
relinquishment of one of the key benefits of ownership — namely, the 
right to the appreciation of a property — such that in certain cases the 
granting of a purchase option might jeopardize true ownership and the 
ability to claim the associated tax benefits.71  In an effort to harmonize 
Section 42 as much as possible with general tax principles, Congress 
ultimately settled on the weaker mechanism of a ROFR in creating the 
Section 42(i)(7) safe harbor.  Notwithstanding the shift away from a 
purchase option, Congress apparently still deemed it worthwhile to 
include the safe harbor to protect against any argument that even the 
granting of a ROFR with a below-market purchase price might 
otherwise jeopardize true ownership and the ability to claim tax credits. 
In making this switch, Congress struck a compromise.  The safe 
harbor deviated less from general tax principles, ensuring that the tax 
credit partnership did not too significantly relinquish one of the key 
indicia of property ownership.  At the same time, the ROFR safe 
harbor theoretically provided a mechanism for keeping long-term 
control in the hands of public-oriented stewards.  Unfortunately, the 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit, 38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 890 (1993). 
 69. See REPORT OF THE MITCHELL-DANFORTH TASK FORCE ON THE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT 19 (1989) (“Non-profit organizations and tenant cooperatives 
should be able to negotiate below-market purchase options during a project’s initial 
development and financing without disqualifying investors from claiming the [c]redit 
while they own the project.”). 
 70. See S. 980, 101st Cong. § 2(y) (1989). 
 71. See Kaye, supra note 68, at 892. 
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conferral of a ROFR with a below-market purchase price, rather than 
a pure purchase option, muddied the waters with respect to the 
necessary conditions required for a nonprofit to acquire the property 
— hence the proliferation of disputes described above.  This lack of 
clarity, along with the failure of the IRS to issue any clarifying guidance 
on the ROFR issue, left the field ripe for exploitation by profit-driven 
entities, frustrating the congressional intent of preserving long-term 
affordability. 
C. Theoretical Approaches to Resolving the Mismatch 
At a broad conceptual level, there are several potential theoretical 
approaches to resolving this collision of housing policy and tax policy.  
The most straightforward one would be to subsidize the construction 
of low-income housing through a more direct mechanism than the tax 
code — namely, via direct appropriations.  It is an odd feature of U.S. 
housing policy that the primary federal low-income housing 
construction program is administered under the auspices of the U.S. 
Department of Treasury and, more specifically, the IRS, rather than 
HUD.72  Notwithstanding some perception of public housing as a 
troubled government program, the program continues to provide 
critical affordable housing to approximately one million of the lowest-
income households.73  Many of the program’s problems stemmed from 
the racially discriminatory manner in which the program was originally 
implemented.74  With adequate federal funding and taking account of 
lessons learned from nearly a century of experimentation with federal 
efforts to subsidize low-income housing, perhaps a newly expanded 
public housing program, for which some are advocating,75 could be 
 
 72. See Saito, supra note 64, at 484 (“But as LIHTC is currently constructed, HUD 
plays a limited role. HUD is not given any significant management or administration 
role in the Code and regulations.”). 
 73. See HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/2TAZ-LYRY] 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (placing the current estimate at approximately 970,000 
households). 
 74. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY 
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17–37 (2017) (recounting the 
history and effects of officially sanctioned racial segregation in public housing). 
 75. See, e.g., PolicyLink, A Bolder Future for Housing Justice: ‘These Times Call 
for Radical Actions,’ SHELTERFORCE (Jan. 15, 2021), 
https://shelterforce.org/2021/01/15/imagining-a-bolder-future-for-housing-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/SU3K-MMY8] (interviewing Tara Raghuveer, the Homes 
Guarantee campaign director at People’s Action, about the campaign’s call for “12 
million new units of social housing, which is housing that’s permanently off of the 
private market, not available for speculation”). 
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designed to address the perceived shortcomings that provided the 
original impetus for the transition to our current privatized model. 
Alternatively, staying within the confines of the tax code, one could 
imagine a tax credit that eliminates the central role of investors in 
determining the long-term fate of a project.  For example, were the 
LIHTC program converted into a refundable tax credit, nonprofit 
developers could dispense with investors entirely and directly invest 
the proceeds of the tax credits in low-income housing.  This strategy 
has the benefit of placing long-term control of the housing squarely in 
the hands of entities that are more likely to preserve long-term 
affordability.  This general sort of approach would not be 
unprecedented.  At the height of the Great Recession, during a period 
of concern that investor equity for tax credits would dry up, Congress 
allowed state housing agencies to exchange LIHTCs for federal funds 
that could be used to make grants and loans directly to developers that 
had previously been awarded tax credits.76 
Of course, both of the above approaches face significant practical 
challenges.  As described above, political considerations are what led 
to the emergence of the LIHTC model and such considerations remain 
forceful.  In addition, these approaches would not satisfy those who 
view the model of leveraging investor involvement as a virtue rather 
than a vice.  In the short term, the least disruptive and most realistic 
solution to the ROFR problem is through more modest amendments 
to the current LIHTC framework. 
III. ADDRESSING THE ROFR PROBLEM 
A. Federal Level 
Particularly notable about the inclusion of a ROFR rather than a 
purchase option in Section 42(i)(7) is that the choice was made for no 
housing policy purpose.  Yet, the distinction ultimately may carry 
significant housing policy implications with respect to long-term 
control of the LIHTC housing stock, depending on how the ROFR 
litigation unfolds.  Equally notable is the fact that Congress faced no 
actual legal obstacle to employing a pure purchase option rather than 
a ROFR with a below-market market purchase price.  Recall that 
 
 76. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 
1602, 123 Stat. 115, 362 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42 note); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AGENCIES 
IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT DATA COLLECTION COULD 
BE IMPROVED 10–11 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-66.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4AA-BVQ6] (describing the mechanics of the exchange program). 
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42(i)(7) is a provision by which Congress provides a safe harbor to 
protect the ability to claim tax credits against otherwise applicable 
general tax principles.  Congress creates tax law and can determine 
when general tax policy principles are relevant.77  In other aspects of 
the LIHTC program, Congress has departed from general tax 
principles — for example, in acknowledging that, unlike as required in 
a typical real estate transaction, investors in LIHTC deals would not 
engage in the transaction but for the tax benefits.78 
Congress could have included a purchase option in the Section 
42(i)(7) safe harbor rather than a ROFR.  This might have accorded 
less with general tax policy principles — it would allow investors to 
claim tax credits even where their right to the appreciation of the 
property is more limited from the outset.  Yet, the choice would have 
provided a tax credit more finely calibrated to achieving congressional 
intent: namely, preserving the long-term affordability of LIHTC 
housing. 
Fortunately, it is not too late to amend the tax code and efforts are 
afoot to do so.  Section 303 of the draft Affordable Housing Credit 
Improvement Act (AHCIA) of 2019 included language that would 
have amended Section 42(i)(7) to strike the term “a right of first 
refusal” and instead insert “an option” — a broader term apparently 
intended to cover both pure purchase options and ROFRs with below-
market purchase prices.79  The draft also included new language that 
would extend safe harbor protection to ROFRs that “may be exercised 
with or without the approval of the taxpayer” and “in response to any 
 
 77. For a similar point, see Multiple Affordable Housing Organizations Respond 
to Right-of-First-Refusal Blog, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/multiple-
affordable-housing-organizations-respond-right-first-refusal-blog 
[https://perma.cc/UY9Y-K279] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (in which a number of 
national organizations, including the National Housing Law Project and the National 
Low Income Housing Coalition, state: “Regardless of general tax policy principles, 
Congress has the authority to determine what the tax law is and in section 42(i)(7), as 
currently existing or as amended by section 303, it can provide who receives the tax 
benefits notwithstanding the existence of a below-market purchase option”). 
 78. See Forrest David Milder, What Does Codification of the “Economic 
Substance Doctrine” Mean for Tax Credit Transactions, NIXON PEABODY (Apr. 21, 
2010), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2010/04/21/what-does-
codification-of-the-economic-substance-doctrine-mean-for-tax-credit-transacti 
[https://perma.cc/L7PB-UQXY] (noting an exception for tax credits like LIHTC 
described in a technical explanation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
concluding that “it appears that transactions that feature the typical tax credits will 
generally not be subjected to economic substance analysis”). 
 79. See Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019, S. 1703, 116th Cong. 
§ 303 (as introduced on June 4, 2019). 
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offer to purchase the property, including an offer by a related party.”80  
The Act stated explicitly that none of the amendments would 
supersede the terms of a preexisting option or ROFR agreement,81 
though some commentators expressed concern that this was not 
entirely clear.82  While Senator Maria Cantwell introduced the bill in 
June of 2019, the proposed legislation never advanced out of the 
Senate Finance Committee. 
Advocates continue to lobby for a legislative fix to the ROFR 
problem.  Senator Cantwell recently reintroduced a modified version 
of the Act as the Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 
2021.83  Unfortunately, former Section 303 that included the provisions 
relevant to the ROFR problem was not included in this version, likely 
given intense lobbying by interests sympathetic to investors.  
Conversations continue about introducing a separate bill that would 
address the ROFR problem.84 
Such a bill should improve upon what was contained in the AHCIA 
of 2019.  Prospectively, for future LIHTC deals, Congress should 
strengthen the language to make clear that safe harbor protection 
would be extended only where a nonprofit is granted a pure purchase 
option at a below-market “debt plus taxes” price.85  While it is 
theoretically conceivable that this could make some investors hesitant 
to negotiate for any purchase rights in future deals, the investor market 
for tax credits is highly competitive.86  This amendment would function 
 
 80. Id. § 303(b)(3). 
 81. Id. § 303(c)(3). 
 82. See Dirk Wallace & Michael Novogradac, Congress Considering Retroactive 
Changes Affecting Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Property Owners, Part I, 
NOVOGRADAC (July 24, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-
novogradac/congress-considering-retroactive-changes-affecting-low-income-housing-
tax-credit-property-owners [https://perma.cc/TA34-DQJB]. 
 83. See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Maria Cantwell, New Cantwell, DelBene 
Legislation Would Build Millions of New Affordable Housing Units Nationwide, Tens 




 84. Adam Carasso, Senior Tax and Econ. Adviser at Senate Fin. Comm., 
Comments to the National Preservation Working Group (July 19, 2021) (discussing 
efforts by Senator Ron Wyden to draft a new bill that, among other provisions, would 
address the ROFR problem). 
 85. The preservation ends of Congress would be even further served by changing 
this minimum purchase price simply to the assumption of project debt, with the 
investor being responsible for any exit taxes. Senator Wyden’s draft legislation 
referenced supra note 84 reportedly takes this approach. 
 86. Research has found that the demand for LIHTCs outpaces supply in all 50 
states, with some states seeing ratios as high as 5:1 comparing applications for total 
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upfront to filter out investors unwilling to clearly agree to transfer 
control after the expiration of the initial use restriction period.87  Such 
an amendment would channel the industry toward using a mechanism: 
1) for which the requirements of execution are clear and 2) that would 
much more effectively serve the congressional goal of transferring 
long-term control to nonprofits. 
Ideally, Congress would go even further than merely strengthening 
the terms of the safe harbor — for example, making it mandatory that 
in nonprofit-developed LIHTC projects, nonprofit general partners 
shall be given a purchase option at the end of the initial compliance 
period.  The notion that nonprofit developers should hold backend 
purchase rights in all such deals is not unprecedented.  An IRS memo 
describing the standards for obtaining 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for 
entities intending to further their charitable purposes by serving as 
nonprofit general partners in LIHTC transactions included in its 
approval requirements that “[t]he applicant must secure a right of first 
refusal to acquire the project at the end of the LIHTC compliance 
period.”88  Amending Section 42 to make the provision of a purchase 
option a mandatory requirement in nonprofit-sponsored developments 
would ensure that this term would be included in all such LIHTC deals.  
This rule might marginally affect investor pricing of deals — but the 
LIHTC industry has enjoyed a robust market for tax credits for 
decades, even when investor prospectus documents assumed limited 
backend profits.89  Again, this amendment would serve to filter out 
those investors not interested in furthering the congressional goal of 
 
LIHTCs to available LIHTCs. See Michael Novogradac, In Demand: Allocation 
Ratios Show Strong Interest in LIHTCs, NOVOGRADAC (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/demand-allocation-ratios-show-
strong-interest-lihtcs [https://perma.cc/6WAB-W94Q] (noting that the data may 
undercount true demand given that some developers may not submit an application 
for LIHTCs given high levels of perceived competition). Regarding investor pricing, 
investors currently pay from the high $.90s to $1.00 per $1.00 of tax credit. See H. Blair 
Kincer & Mark O’Meara, A Look at the LIHTC: Past Pricing Trends, the Current 
Market and Future Concerns, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, no. 3, Mar. 2020, at 3. 
As recently as 2016, investors were paying more than $1.05 per $1.00 of tax credit given 
the other benefits, including Community Reinvestment Act credit, an attendant to 
LIHTC investments. Id. at 2. See also supra note 21 regarding the financial benefits of 
LIHTCs to investors and the relevance of the Community Reinvestment Act. 
 87. Under current law, investors can shield themselves behind the argument that 
granting a purchase option might jeopardize their ability to claim the tax credits. 
 88. See Memorandum from Robert S. Choi, Dir. of EO Rulings and Agreements 
to Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of Treasury 3 (July 30, 2007), 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/choi_memo_073007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZF8R-2FMB]. 
 89. See supra note 86. 
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transferring control of the project to nonprofits at the end of the initial 
use restriction period. 
Retrospectively, attempting to address the ROFR problem in 
preexisting partnerships — where a tax credit partnership has already 
granted a ROFR with a below-market purchase price to the nonprofit 
general partner — is a more delicate issue.  At a minimum, Congress 
could provide rules of interpretation for use where the agreement 
between the parties is silent as to the key terms regularly in dispute — 
for example, whether owner/investor willingness to sell is required and 
whether a triggering offer must be from an unrelated third-party.  
Investors have attempted to cast such clarifying efforts as retroactive 
changes to program rules, claiming they constitute an uncompensated 
taking of private property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause.90  Query, however, whether a takings challenge under 
a Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York style analysis 
would succeed.91  Certainly, for the many partnerships that have not 
yet been taken over by an aggregator, it would seem difficult for 
original investors whose projections forecast little to no backend gain 
to now claim that such rules of interpretation would interfere with their 
“distinct investment-backed expectations.”92 
B. State Level 
In conjunction with such federal efforts, states can also play an 
important role in addressing the ROFR problem.  This is particularly 
true prior to the enactment of any federal legislation or if Congress 
enacts a fix that is limited to clarifying the safe harbor rather than 
making a purchase option mandatory.  State governments create the 
rules used to determine which LIHTC applications receive an award of 
 
 90. See Jeffrey M. Harris, An Unconstitutional Attempt to Address Affordable 
Housing, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 168, 177 (2019) (arguing that Section 303 of the 
Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2019 would have worked a taking of 
limited partner investor interests in LIHTC partnerships). 
 91. See 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978) (noting, among other factors relevant to takings 
analysis, whether government action sufficiently frustrates “distinct investment-
backed expectations”). 
 92. Id. For those interests that have been taken over by an aggregator, courts may 
need to determine the degree to which all investment-backed expectations — even 
those that run clearly counter to public policy — are treated as of equal weight. More 
generally, original investors and aggregators would carry the burden of trying to 
convince a court that a property right is infringed upon where Congress simply clarifies 
rules of interpretation to be used in the absence of explicit contract terms to the 
contrary. 
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tax credits.93  Section 42 requires that these rules be set forth in a 
“qualified allocation plan” (QAP) adopted by the state.94 
States should amend their QAPs to help address the ROFR 
problem.  In nonprofit-sponsored deals, states should require that 
nonprofit general partners be given backend purchase rights as a 
prerequisite for receiving an award of tax credits.95  Cautious states 
may start with a ROFR requirement and consider making a pure 
purchase option requirement contingent upon a change to Section 42 
that ensures safe harbor protection for such options.96  Jurisdictions 
that adopt this approach should clearly define the requisite conditions 
precedent for the nonprofit to exercise its ROFR.97 
The Washington State Housing Finance Commission has gone even 
further, proposing a change to its compliance manual that would 
require agency consent to certain limited partner interest transfers.98  
Other best practices might include limiting future program 
participation by investors who dispute nonprofit purchase rights.  The 
National Preservation Working Group, an association with the purpose 
of preserving the affordability of low-income housing, is working with 
certain state housing finance agencies to incorporate such best 
practices into their QAPs.99  Because the ROFR problem can arise in 
 
 93. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Lauren Loney & Heather Way, Strategies and Tools for Preserving Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit Properties, 28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 
255, 276–77 (2019) (suggesting that “[s]tates and cities can improve preservation-
oriented organizations’ ability to preserve LIHTC properties by adopting stronger 
ROFR and purchase-option polices for qualified nonprofit entities”). 
 96. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, 
which is a unique local jurisdiction that allocates a portion of New York State’s LIHTC 
allotment, has incorporated this contingency approach in its 2021 draft QAP. See 2021 
Draft Qualified Allocation Plan, N.Y.C. (N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., Draft, 
2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/2021-draft-qualified-
allocation-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJK5-G3S7]. 
 97. For example, New York City has required in its draft QAP that nonprofit 
applicants for tax credits must submit a letter of intent between the LIHTC partners 
demonstrating that a qualified nonprofit shall be given a ROFR that can be exercised 
without limited partner consent “following the General Partner’s receipt of a bona fide 
third party offer to purchase the project.” Id. 
 98. See Proposed Revisions to the Chapter 9 Property Transfers Policy for the 2020 
Program Year, WASH. ST. HOUS. FIN. COMM’N, http://wshfc.org/managers/policy.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JHS9-KJ7D] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021). 
 99. Massachusetts, Washington, Virginia, Washington D.C., and New York City 
are among the jurisdictions already considering policy fixes to the ROFR problem. 
Robert Rozen, Comments to the National Preservation Working Group (July 19, 
2021); see also NAT’L HOUS. TR., LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT (LIHTC) 
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any state, all 50 state housing finance agencies would be wise to join 
such efforts to help secure long-term affordability of their LIHTC 
housing stock.  Given the growing nature of this problem, states must 
be proactive to stem the tide. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike Opportunity Zones, a tax break designed to benefit wealthy 
investors based on fundamentally flawed theoretical grounds, the 
LIHTC program plays an important role in improving the lives of 
millions of low-income U.S. households through the provision of 
decent, affordable housing.  LIHTC housing developed by nonprofit 
developers is of particular value given, among other benefits, their 
much greater likelihood of preserving long-term affordability. 
Investor efforts to thwart the ability of nonprofit developers to 
acquire LIHTC properties upon the expiration of use restrictions 
threaten the ongoing viability of this stock of housing as an important 
resource for low-income families.  This vulnerability of the program 
arises as an artifact of an attempt to harmonize Section 42 with general 
tax policy principles that are ill suited in the context of a LIHTC real 
estate transaction.  Broader theoretical fixes that more clearly place 
long-term project control in the hands of public-oriented stakeholders 
are conceivable but, at least at the moment, not politically viable. 
As such, the Biden Administration should prioritize working with 
Congress to enact a legislative fix to Section 42 that not only clarifies 
the safe harbor, but also ensures that nonprofits are given a purchase 
option in all nonprofit-sponsored LIHTC deals.  States meanwhile 
should amend their credit allocation rules to award credits more 
selectively to projects with clear mechanisms for preserving long-term 
control.  Unlike the Opportunity Zone program, such interventions at 
the federal and state levels would be certain to have an immediate and 
positive impact on the lives of low-income U.S. households. 
 
ALLOCATING AGENCIES 1 (2021) (recommending other best practices for states, 
including conducting early outreach to nonprofit to prepare for Year 15, educating 
general partners early about their ROFR rights, and helping to create an entity that 
could make ROFR-triggering offers). 
